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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 09-3745 
_____________ 
                         
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
SEAN L. HAGINS, 
Appellant                          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-06-cr-00485-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 15, 2011 
 
Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, RENDELL and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: November 18, 2011)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Defendant Sean Hagins appeals his criminal conviction for conspiring to straw-
purchase firearms and possessing firearms as a convicted felon.  Hagins argues that the 
District Court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence; his motion to sever 
offenses; his motion to dismiss the indictment; and his motion in limine to exclude certain 
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evidence.  He also contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s guilty 
verdict; and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in the course of his trial.  
For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
Background 
 
Hagins was arrested in December 2004 based on the following circumstances.  
Alexander Panchenko was driving on Interstate 95 in Philadelphia when a white Audi 
with New Jersey plates cut him off repeatedly.  Hagins, who was driving the Audi, yelled 
obscenities and then pointed a gun at Panchenko.  The Audi exited I-95 at Cottman 
Avenue.  Panchenko called the police and described the driver as a black male with 
dreadlocks, described the car as a white Audi with New Jersey plates, and reported that 
the car exited the interstate at Cottman Avenue.  Three police officers heard the resulting 
broadcast report and drove toward Cottman Avenue.  They arrived there two minutes 
after Panchenko alerted the police, saw a car matching Panchenko’s description, and 
pulled it over.  As the officers approached the vehicle, Hagins repeated, “It was a radio 
face,” suggesting that he had not pointed a gun but a face plate for a car stereo system at 
Panchenko.  The police ordered Hagins out of the car.  While one officer was talking with 
Hagins, another officer searched the car and found a gun tucked into a space between the 
center console and the floor on the driver’s side of the car.  Panchenko was brought to 
where Hagins was stopped and positively identified him as the man who pointed the gun 
at him on Interstate 95.  Thereafter, Hagins was placed under arrest. 
Before his arrest, Hagins also orchestrated straw purchases of firearms through 
David Downs because, as a convicted felon, Hagins could not purchase firearms himself.  
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Downs purchased about fifty guns for Hagins between September 2004 and June 2005.  
In exchange, Hagins paid Downs and also provided him crack cocaine.  Federal 
investigators confronted Downs with suspicions that he had engaged in straw purchases.  
Downs confessed his involvement, identified Hagins as the person for whom he was 
purchasing the weapons, and agreed to cooperate with the Government’s investigation.  
Downs wore a wire in conversations with Hagins between January 2006 and February 
2006, in which the two agreed that Downs would purchase more guns for Hagins. 
In December 2007, a grand jury returned a seven-count second superseding 
indictment that charged Hagins with the following:  one count of conspiring to straw-
purchase firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (“Count One”); two counts of using a 
firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) 
(“Count Two” and “Count Three”); and four counts of possessing a firearm as a 
convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (“Count Four”, “Count Five”, 
“Count Six”, and “Count Seven”).   
Hagins was tried by a jury in February 2008.  The jury returned a verdict finding 
Hagins guilty of Count One and Counts Four through Seven; it acquitted him on Counts 
Two and Three.  Thereafter, Hagins moved for a judgment of acquittal and/or for a new 
trial; he also filed various post-trial motions.  The District Court denied all of Hagins’ 
motions, and sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment. 
Discussion 
 We address each of Hagins’ arguments in turn.  
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 A.  Motion to Suppress Evidence From The 2004 Arrest 
Hagins contends that the stop and search of his vehicle in December 2004 was 
illegal because the police officers did not have probable cause to arrest him and search 
the vehicle when they did.  In the alternative, Hagins contends that even if he was subject 
only to a Terry stop, the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him and to 
search his car.  Therefore, he submits that physical evidence seized from his car, the gun, 
should have been suppressed. 
When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we review the factual 
findings of the district court for clear error, and exercise plenary review over the 
application of law to those facts.  United States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209, 210 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
First, Hagins asserts that he was de facto arrested without probable cause when he 
was removed from his car and handcuffed while officers searched his vehicle.  This 
argument is untenable in light of our decision in United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 442, 
447-48 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding no de facto arrest occurred where the police encircled the 
car, drew their weapons, yelled at the occupants, and handcuffed the suspect).  As such, 
Hagins was not arrested when he was removed from the vehicle, and therefore no 
probable cause was required at the time the police searched Hagins’ car.    
Hagins contends that, even if his removal from the vehicle amounted only to a 
Terry stop, the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to remove him and to search his 
car.  Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), an officer may conduct a brief investigatory 
stop when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.  
5 
 
United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal citations 
omitted).  Courts evaluate whether reasonable suspicion exists at the time of the stop 
based on the “totality of the circumstances.”  United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 
353 (3d Cir. 2000). 
As the District Court correctly analyzed, the facts here demonstrate that the 
officers had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot when they stopped 
Hagins.  Just a few minutes after Panchenko called the police to report the incident on 
Interstate 95, the officers found, at the location identified, a car and a driver which 
matched Panchenko’s description.  When the officers approached Hagins, he told them it 
was not a gun but a face plate that he pointed at Panchenko.  This statement corroborated 
Panchenko’s version of the incident, and confirmed Hagins’ involvement in the 
altercation.  Based on these facts, the police had reasonable suspicion to believe Hagins 
was armed.  Ordering him out of the vehicle was, as such, a permissible Terry stop.   
Given that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Hagins was armed, the 
officers also properly performed a Terry search of the passenger compartment of Hagins’ 
car, where they found the gun.  See United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 
2004) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1986) (holding that during a 
traffic stop, an officer may conduct a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle 
if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the occupants might be armed and dangerous).   
Hagins mistakenly relies on Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), to support his 
argument, asserting that the police were not authorized to perform a search of the vehicle 
because he was already secured outside the vehicle.  But Gant does not apply to this case.  
6 
 
Gant clarifies the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, but 
leaves untouched the Terry stop and search exception to the warrant requirement.  The 
search incident to arrest exception is simply not applicable here.   
In sum, because the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Hagins and to 
perform a search of the passenger compartment of the car, the District Court did not err in 
denying his motion to suppress the gun found in his car from evidence. 
B. Motion to Sever Offenses 
Hagins contends that the District Court erred in denying his pre-trial motion to 
sever Count Seven from Counts One through Six of the second superseding indictment 
because Counts One through Six related to the conspiracy to straw-purchase weapons 
between Downs and him, while Count Seven, charging him with being a felon in 
possession of a firearm, related to his December 2004 arrest and thus did not involve 
Downs.   
We review the denial of a motion to sever offenses for abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 369 (3d Cir. 2001).  Multiple offenses may be joined in 
three circumstances: (1) when they are based on the same transaction; (2) when they 
constitute part of a common scheme or plan; and (3) when they are of the same or similar 
character.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a).  Multiple offenses, in turn, may be severed if their 
joinder appears to prejudice a defendant.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. 
Hagins contends that there is no transactional nexus between Counts One through 
Six and Count Seven, and that they are not part of a common scheme or plan.  But the 
District Court correctly concluded that the Counts are of the same or similar character: 
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Counts Four through Seven are all felon-in-possession offenses.  It does not matter that 
each Count identifies different acts of possession at different times. 
Moreover, the District Court’s denial of this motion did not prejudice Hagins.  To 
establish that severance is warranted under Rule 14, a defendant must demonstrate clear 
and substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial.  United States v. Eufrasio, 
935 F.2d 553, 569 (3d Cir. 1991).  Hagins does not point to any specific evidence 
showing prejudice; he simply states that the jury was unable to separate the December 
2004 incident from the straw purchase conspiracy, and that the jury improperly inferred a 
criminal disposition.  These bald assertions do not demonstrate “clear and substantial 
prejudice.”  Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hagins’ 
motion to sever offenses. 
C. Motion to Dismiss the Second Superseding Indictment 
Hagins asserts that the District Court improperly denied his motion to dismiss the 
second superseding indictment because the Government engaged in outrageous conduct 
by issuing it.  He claims that after he chose to exercise his right to trial by jury, the 
Government vindictively issued the second superseding indictment that included Count 
Seven for the first time, which was based on the December 2004 arrest.  He also contends 
that the Government’s use of Downs as the main witness was outrageous because Downs, 
Hagins alleges, lied to law enforcement and signed a false affidavit.  Finally, Hagins 
submits that two witnesses, Victor Lawson and Gilbert Nickens, were planted in the 
prison where Hagins was held in order to elicit incriminating information from him.   
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When reviewing a claim of outrageous government conduct, we exercise plenary 
review over the district court’s legal conclusions, and review any challenges to the 
district court’s factual findings for clear error.  United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 
153 (3d Cir. 2008).  In order to prevail on this argument, the government’s conduct must 
be “shocking, outrageous, and clearly intolerable.”  United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 
F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 1998).  Outrageous government conduct is an extraordinary 
defense reserved only for the most egregious circumstances.  Id. at 230-31.     
Here, the District Court properly denied Hagins’ motion.  The simple fact that the 
Government issued a second superseding indictment after Hagins refused to cooperate 
and chose to exercise his right to a jury trial does not support a claim for outrageousness.  
See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 (1982) (“[A] prosecutor may file 
additional charges if an initial expectation that a defendant would plead guilty . . . proves 
unfounded.”).   
Similarly, Hagins points to no specific facts that support his contention that the 
Government’s use of Downs as a witness was outrageous.  It does not matter if Downs 
lied or provided false information to law enforcement, an assertion which is in no way 
substantiated here.  As the District Court noted in its opinion denying the motion, “the 
fact that a cooperating witness for the government engaged in unlawful activity does not 
render his employ inherently outrageous . . . .”  (Supp. App. 22.) 
 Hagins also submits that the Government’s use of witnesses who were allegedly 
planted as jailhouse informants was outrageous.  Use of jailhouse informants raises a 
potential Sixth Amendment right to counsel violation.  A defendant’s right to counsel is 
9 
 
violated when (1) the right to counsel had attached at the time of the alleged 
infringement; (2) the informant was acting as a “government agent”; and (3) the 
informant engaged in “deliberate elicitation” of incriminating information from the 
defendant.  Matteo v. Superintendent, 171 F.3d 877, 892 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 Hagins and Lawson played Scrabble together in prison and they discussed their 
cases together after discovering that they had similar criminal histories.  Lawson 
cooperated with the Government by relaying these conversations to investigators, and 
testified to these discussions at Hagins’ trial.  Lawson’s cooperation did not stem from 
his being a government agent.  According to his testimony, he instead reported the 
conversations to the Government in order to get a more lenient sentence.  Thus, using 
Lawson’s testimony was neither outrageous nor a violation of Hagins’ right to counsel 
because Lawson was not a government agent.   
Nor was using Nickens’ testimony outrageous or a violation of Hagins’ right to 
counsel.  First, Nickens and Hagins were never in prison together; therefore, use of his 
testimony did not violate Hagins’ right to counsel.  Second, use of Nickens’ testimony 
was not outrageous; Nickens simply testified about previously purchasing weapons from 
Hagins.   
Therefore, the District Court properly denied Hagins’ motion to dismiss the 
second superseding indictment. 
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D. Motion in Limine 
Hagins asserts that the District Court improperly denied his motion in limine to 
exclude recorded conversations between Downs and Hagins occurring from January to 
February 2006.  Downs cooperated with the Government in having and recording these 
conversations, which occurred about six months after Downs made his last straw 
purchase for Hagins.  As such, Hagins contends that the conversations are irrelevant, 
inadmissible other bad acts evidence, or unfairly prejudicial because the conspiracy 
between Downs and him occurred from September 2004 to June 2005. 
 We review a district court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion, 
which “may be reversed only when clearly contrary to reason and not justified by the 
evidence.”  United States v. Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted). 
 The District Court correctly concluded that the conversations fall squarely within 
Rule 401’s definition of relevant evidence.  Rule 401 provides that relevant evidence is 
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence.”  Fed. R. Evid. 401.  Hagins and Downs discussed previous purchases that 
Downs made for Hagins, and referenced specific guns Downs purchased, the possession 
of which Hagins was charged with in the indictment, as well as specific stores from 
which Downs purchased them.  These conversations are clearly relevant, as they tend to 
make it more probable that Hagins actually committed the offenses with which he was 
charged. 
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Next, Hagins contends that the conversations are impermissible Rule 404(b) 
evidence.  Rule 404(b) bars admission of evidence of other bad acts if it is admitted to 
show a defendant’s propensity to commit the offense at issue.  But evidence of other bad 
acts may be “admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . .”  Fed. R. 
Evid. 404(b).   
The District Court correctly concluded that the conversations were admissible 
under 404(b) because they (1) show Hagins’ intent, opportunity and preparation for 
conducting future straw purchases, (2) make direct references to Hagins’ knowledge of 
the methods used to conceal the origins of illegally obtained weapons, and (3) evidence 
the common plan between Downs and him.  These are all valid reasons to admit the 
conversations. 
Finally, Hagins contends that the conversations were unfairly prejudicial and of 
limited probative value because the jury would conclude automatically that Hagins had 
interacted with Downs in the past.  Rule 403 permits the district court to exclude relevant 
evidence whose “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice . . . .”  Fed. R. Evid. 403.   
While the conversations here are certainly prejudicial, they are not unfairly so.  
See Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 972 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that Rule 403 “does not 
offer protection against evidence that is merely prejudicial, in the sense of being 
detrimental to a party’s case”).  Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only when it has “an 
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not 
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necessarily, an emotional one.”  Fed. R. Evid. 403, Advisory Committee’s Note.  The 
conversations here offer no hint of prejudice of this sort.  Moreover, they are highly 
probative of the fact that Hagins and Downs had a straw purchasing arrangement, and 
their significant probative value is not substantially outweighed by any danger of unfair 
prejudice. 
Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion in 
limine to exclude the recorded conversations. 
E. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Next, Hagins urges that the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to 
prove the charges against him.  Hagins asserts that the evidence was insufficient because 
the District Court should never have permitted the jury to hear allegedly false and 
incredible testimony from Downs, Lawson and Nickens.   
We apply a particularly deferential standard of review to a challenge of a 
conviction for insufficiency of the evidence.  An insufficiency claim places a very heavy 
burden on a defendant.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government, “we will sustain the verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Dent, 149 
F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
 It is inappropriate for this Court to consider whether these witnesses’ testimony 
was false or incredible when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.  See United States 
v. Beckett, 208 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasizing that a reviewing court does not 
determine the credibility of witnesses on an insufficiency of the evidence challenge).  
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Their testimony was properly allowed, and in viewing their testimony in the light most 
favorable to the Government, a rational trier of fact could certainly have found that the 
essential elements of the crimes were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 Hagins also asserts the evidence was insufficient to sustain the felon-in-possession 
conviction stemming from his December 2004 arrest.  Given that the gun found in 
Hagins’ car was properly admitted and not subject to suppression, see supra, the evidence 
was sufficient to sustain Hagins’ conviction on Count Seven.   
 Therefore, we find that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Hagins’ convictions 
on Count One and Counts Four through Seven. 
 F. Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim 
 Finally, Hagins raises an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, asserting that his 
lawyer was ineffective during the course of his trial for not calling certain witnesses and 
for not investigating the end possessors of the firearms.  While we normally do not 
entertain claims for ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, a narrow exception 
exists where the record is sufficient to allow determination of the claim, and an 
evidentiary hearing to develop the facts is not needed.  United States v. Headley, 923 
F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991).  Here, the District Court conducted a thorough hearing 
on Hagins’ post-trial ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.  Given that the record is 
sufficiently developed, we will entertain the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on 
appeal. 
 When entertaining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, we 
review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error, and make an independent 
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judgment on whether the facts constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  Virgin Islands 
v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1430-31 (3d Cir. 1996).  To make out an ineffective-
assistance claim, the defendant must show that his trial counsel’s performance was 
deficient and that such performance prejudiced the defendant.  Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984).  The defendant must establish a reasonable probability that, but for 
the attorney’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been 
different.  Id. at 694.    
 Hagins contends that his brother, Craig, should have testified on his behalf at trial 
in order to impeach Downs.  Downs testified that he purchased a gun for Hagins, and 
turned it over to Craig, but Craig would have testified that he did not know Downs.  
Matthew Engle, Hagins’ lawyer during the trial, testified that he did not call Craig 
because Craig testified before the grand jury, and Engle was concerned about implicating 
Craig’s Fifth Amendment rights and wanted to avoid any possible obstruction of justice.  
Also, Engle did not believe that Craig’s testimony would significantly call into question 
Downs’ credibility.  Craig also had a troubled criminal history, the airing of which would 
not do much to advance Hagins’ defense. 
Hagins also contends that his wife should have been called to testify in order to 
impeach Panchenko.  Panchenko testified that Hagins’ wife was present during the 
December 2004 incident, but she was not.  Her testimony might have called into question 
Panchenko’s ability to observe and make accurate identifications.  But impeaching 
Panchenko in this regard would not have added significantly to Hagins’ defense. 
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Finally, Hagins asserts that Engle should have investigated the end possessors of 
the firearms to determine who provided the guns to them.  Had counsel done so, the end 
possessors might have testified that they did not acquire the guns from Hagins.  But 
Hagins produced no such testimony at his post-trial hearing before the District Court.  
This assertion is not enough to show prejudice, for prejudice cannot be demonstrated by 
speculation about what the witnesses that the attorney failed to locate or depose might 
have said.  See United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 712 (3d Cir. 1989). 
Here, the District Court correctly concluded that none of the alleged errors 
“begin[s] to approach error as contemplated by Strickland.”  (Supp. App. 35 n.2.)  As 
such, we find that Hagins’ ineffective-assistance claim fails on both prongs.   
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
